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Abstract 
The binary and multinomial logit models are applied for prediction of the Russian banks 
defaults (license withdrawals) using data from bank balance sheets and macroeconomic 
indicators. Significantly different models correspond to the two main grounds for license 
withdrawal: financial insolvency and money laundering. Analysis of data for the period 
2005.2–2008.4 for accurate prediction of a bank’s financial insolvency, which is the focus of 
interest for the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency, demonstrates that the multinomial model 
doesn’t outperform the binary model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A country’s banking system plays an important role in that country’s economic growth. 
Financial and banking crises decrease the economic growth and lead to economic stagnation. 
The main goal of the bank supervision authorities is to support the stable development of the 
banking system. This goal is especially important in the countries whose economies are in 
transition, where banks and bank supervisors have only short experience of working under 
conditions of the market economy. 
Necessity for the stable development of the national banking system in Russian 
Federation was starkly revealed during the financial crisis of 1998, during the “credibility 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to the participants of the conferences in Metabief (France), January 2010; 
Vilnius (Lithuania), June 2010, Minsk (Belarus), September, 2010, EBES, Athens, October 2010 for 
helpful discussions. 
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crisis” in summer 2004, and again during the 2008 financial crisis. The number of banks in 
the Russian Federation which had been higher than 2000 before 1998, dropped from 1136 to 
1108 during the year 2008. This number of banks is still too large for the regular on-site 
supervisory inspections by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CB RF), or the 
Deposit Insurance Agency of the Russian Federation (DIA). Hence there is urgent need for 
the off-site monitoring of the Russian banking system. 
Regular off-site monitoring of banks’ financial solvency using on-line analysis of 
their monthly, quarterly, or yearly balance sheets may allow the filtering out of an “at risk 
group” of banks whose financial solvency could be questionable in the near future. Of course, 
such off-site methods (Early Warning Systems, EWS) are not able to determine exactly the 
financial state of a bank. Nevertheless they can significantly reduce the expenses of banking 
supervision since a regulator may prioritize inspection of banks from the “at risk group” 
according to the off-site monitoring system. This would increase efficiency of the bank 
supervision system and hence, by preventing insolvency of the banks, increase stability of the 
banking system as a whole. 
 
The subject of this paper concerns one aspect of the design of an efficient off-site 
system: the question of which are the best econometric tools to use for estimating the 
probability of the future failure of a bank, and if so, due to which criteria this failure will 
come about. In particular, two standard models are compared: the binary model and the 
multinomial model. Both models use only publicly available information on microeconomic 
factors (banks’ balance sheet data) and macroeconomic indicators. The main questions are: 
• Which factors drive license withdrawal on grounds of financial insolvency and which on 
grounds of money laundering? 
• For the DIA activity, forecasting the probability of bank license withdrawal on the 
grounds of financial insolvency is especially important. A bank which loses its license as the 
penalty for money laundering often has enough money to fulfill its financial obligations, and 
then the DIA has no extra expenditures related to the bank liquidation. This is why the 
question of principal practical importance is if it is possible to increase accuracy of the 
forecast of bank license withdrawal on economic grounds (financial insolvency) using a 
multinomial model (with 3 possible outcomes) in comparison with a binary logit model. 
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2. Literature review 
 
There are several approaches to the econometric modeling of a bank’s solvency based 
on the use of publicly available information. 
The first approach is to model the probability of a bank default by using historical 
data on bank defaults. A natural instrument for this is the binary choice model (logit-, probit- 
model). This approach was applied to bank defaults in the USA in a number of papers (e.g. 
Kolari, et al., 2002; Cole, et al., 1995a; Collier, et al, 2003), and for Russian banks in 
(Peresetsky et al., 2004a; 2007, 2011). 
A second approach is to use econometric models of the ratings of financial stability 
assigned to banks by a rating agency. Such a model (ordered logit, probit) absorbs the 
information from the agency’s rating which could be derived from public information. Using 
this model it is possible to calculate a forecasted “model rating” for each bank. Such model 
ratings reflect the opinion of a rating agency’s experts. For non-financial firms in the USA 
this approach was realized for example in (Altman, Rijken, 2004), and for Russian banks in 
(van Soest, et al., 2003, Karminsky, Peresetsky, 2007; Peresetsky, Karminsky, 2008, 2011; 
Peresetsky, 2009). 
A variant of this second approach is based on the use of information from a survey 
among independent financial experts. This approach was suggested in (Soest et al., 2003, 
Peresetsky et al., 2004b). The experts were asked to assign ratings to various real (named) 
banks and to other (unnamed) “virtual banks”. They were provided with information 
consisting of selected indicators from bank balance sheets: real data for the named banks and 
artificial data for the unnamed banks (the values of the indicators comprising the virtual data 
were all in approximately the same ranges as those for the real banks). On the survey data one 
can design econometric models for “real” or “virtual” banks. A possible advantage of this 
approach is that the models reflect opinions of the experts from various financial structures, 
while the opinion of experts from a rating agency is in principle more narrowly defined. 
Moreover since the bank pays the rating agency for the rating, the situation may arise where a 
rating agency is not inclined to degrade the rating of a particular bank. This problem is 
widely discussed in the literature (e.g. Partnoy, 1999; Poon, 2003; Roy, 2006) especially after 
world financial crisis of 2008. A disadvantage is that independent experts do not have access 
to the internal information of a bank which is available to rating agency experts. 
A third approach is based on the analysis of interest rates, for example a bank’s 
interest rates on household deposits. In the presence of market discipline, which is one of the 
 3
Basel-II pillars, depositors require high deposit interest rates from banks with risky financial 
policies. That is, as long as market discipline exists, high interest rates for a bank’s household 
deposits are a signal of excessive risk taking by that bank. 
A fourth approach uses estimates of a bank’s technical efficiency (or cost efficiency). 
There is a consensus that a bank’s cost efficiency is correlated to that bank’s solvency. It is 
why models for   bank cost efficiency also provide information on bank solvency. 
A fifth approach is based on the analysis of market information on prices of banks’ 
securities quotations. This approach is very promising since market price accumulates all 
publicly available information. Unfortunately it still can not be applied to Russian banks 
since only a few of them issue securities quoted on the stock exchange. 
The earliest models designed to forecast probability of a bank (firm, bond) default 
were based on analysis of financial ratios, calculated from balance sheet data and were 
offered in the 1960s (e.g. Beaver, 1966). Significant progress was achieved in the late 1960s, 
when the development of statistical and econometric models for forecasting defaults first 
started. The first such model appeared in the seminal paper by Altman (1968), where the 
discriminant analysis model was applied for the classification of firms in two classes: solvent 
firms and firms having a high probability of default on the basis of the firm’s balance sheet 
data over some previous period of time. Altman proposed the “Z-score” (Altman’s Z) — a 
linear combination of 5 financial indicators, which was enhanced later (Altman et al., 1977) 
to the ZETA model. Later, discriminant analysis was used for forecasting defaults in (Izan, 
1984), (Scott, 1981). 
Ten years later Martin (1977) was the first to apply a binary choice logit model to 
predict defaults of US banks in 1975–1976. That model has some advantages over the linear 
discriminant analysis model: 1) it doesn’t assume a normal distribution for the financial 
indicators included in the model, and 2) the logit model does predict the probability of 
default, thus allows for more than only a binary outcome (default / no default). What is more 
important, it is possible to estimate significance of the indicators, included in the model. 
Binary choice models (logit, probit) are used to model probabilities of firm and bank defaults 
in a number of papers, e.g. (Wiginton, 1980), (Ohlson, 1980), (Bovenzi et al., 1983), (Cole, 
Gunther, 1995b, 1998), (Estrella et al., 2000), (Westgaard, Wijst, 2001), (Kolari et al., 2002), 
(Altman, Raijken, 2004), (Godlewski, 2007). 
In the paper (Hirtle, Lopez, 1999) it was shown that expert opinion (CAMEL rating), 
in comparison with bank balance sheet data, ceased after about six to twelve quarters to 
provide any useful information, about the current condition of a bank. 
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There are few papers comparing the predictive power of discriminant analysis and 
binary choice models (logit, probit). Lennox (1999), Lin (2009) both come to the conclusion 
that the logit model outperforms the discriminant analysis model; Altman et al. (1994), 
Jagtiani et al. (2003) do not find any significant difference in the predictive power of the two 
models. 
Some papers apply various non-statistical approaches to default forecasting: trait 
recognition model (Kolari et al., 2002), recursive partitioning (Espahbodi, Espahbodi, 2003), 
neural network analysis (Coats, Fant, 1993), (Jagtiani et al., 2003), (Lin, 2009). However, in 
papers where these methods were compared with others by applying them to real data 
(Altman et al., 1994), (Jagtiani et al., 2003), (Lin, 2009) it was demonstrated that the logit 
model outperforms non-statistical methods in predictive power. 
In practice only bank supervising authorities in the two countries USA and Russia use 
any econometric probability of bank default models. 
USA. Supervisory BOPEC ratings were assigned to bank holding companies (BHCs) 
during the years 1987 to 2004 as a summary of their overall performance and indication of 
the level of supervisory concern they provoked.2 Similar ratings were assigned to the banks, 
by FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) which supervises state-chartered banks that 
are not members of the Federal Reserve System (Sahajwala, Bergh, 2000). Both supervisors 
accumulated significant amounts of (confidential) data — internal ratings — as well as 
results of on-site bank examinations. Researches of both agencies used this data to design 
econometric models for off-site analysis of banks’ solvency and EWS (Early Warning 
System) (Collier et al., 2003), (Gilbert et al., 2002), (Jagtiani et al., 2003), (Krainer, Lopez, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009), (Oshinsky, Olin, 2006), (Sahajwala, Bergh, 2000). The 
system SEER was designed at Federal Reserve (Gilbert et al., 2002), (Jagtiani et al., 2003), 
(Krainer, Lopez, 2002), (Sahajwala, Bergh, 2000), an early version of which was named 
FIMS (Cole et al., 1995a); and the SCOR system was designed in FDIC (Collier et al., 2003), 
(Oshinsky, Olin, 2006), (Sahajwala, Bergh, 2000). The systems SCOR and SEER are very 
similar; one essential difference is that SCOR did not take into account previous CAMEL 
ratings. 
                                                 
2 Starting in 2005, the Federal Reserve’s BHC supervisory rating system was changed from a method 
of historical analysis of BHC financial conditions to a RFI/C(D) rating system. Each inspected BHC 
is assigned a “C” composite rating, which is based on an evaluation of its managerial and financial 
condition as well as the future potential risk of its subsidiary depository institutions (Krainer, Lopez, 
2009). 
 5
The SCOR system was developed in the late 1990s, as a complement to on-site 
inspections. The main purpose was to discriminate sound banks having CAMEL ratings of 1 
or 2 from those with a rating of 3–5 which are assumed therefore to have some problems 
(Collier et al., 2003). The accuracy of the SCOR forecasts was measured by the probabilities 
of Type I and II errors. A Type I error is the failure to detect a downgrade before it occurs, 
while Type II error is a “false alarm”, when the system forecasts a rating downgrade but the 
bank is found on subsequent examination to be sound. For the SCOR system, the accuracy 
check benchmark was CAEL, the off-site monitoring system developed at the FDIC during 
the mid-1980s. CAEL was an expert system that used basic ratios from the Call Reports 
which rated institutions on a scale of 0.5 to 5.5. 
An initial choice of financial indicators for SCOR was made by experts, but the final 
selection of indicators and their weights was made by statistical analysis of the coefficients in 
econometric models used. The models were re-estimated quarterly. SCOR models for 
horizons of 16–18 months were designed. They used 12 financial bank variables as a 
percentage of assets, and they were based on the ordered choice econometric model. The 
models forecast probabilities ip  for each grade 1,...,5i =  of the rating. The rating forecasts 
were calculated as the weighted average 5
1 ii
i p= ⋅∑  (Collier et al., 2003). 
In comparison with the expert model CAEL, the SCOR model outperformed CAEL at 
all forecast horizons and SCOR was adopted to replace CAEL. SCOR is not good at 
discriminating between banks with ratings 1 and 2, because the difference between these 
grades significantly depends on non-formalized factors (Collier et al., 2003). 
The SEER system is similar in spirit to SCOR. It consists of two models which 
complement each other. First, the ordered choice model, which forecasts the probabilities of 
the CAMEL rating, second, the binary choice model, which forecasts “default” i.e. 
downgrading of the CAMEL rating from 1–2 to 3–5 (Gilbert et al., 2002).  
Researchers from Federal Reserve and FDIC have been looking at some other 
directions for future improvements of these models: 
Krainer, Lopez (2003, 2004, 2008) study whether market information can improve the 
predictive power of the models. Unfortunately that question is still open for Russian banks 
since only a few of them issue securities quoted on the stock exchange. 
Oshinsky, Olin (2006) consider a multinomial (unordered multiple choice) model for 
forecasting the possible future state of a “problem” bank (with CAMEL rating 3–5): recover, 
merge, remain a problem, fail. 
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Russia. The Russian State Corporation “Deposit Insurance Agency” (DIA) uses 
econometrics models for the probability of bank default to estimate the adequacy of the 
Deposit Insurance Fund. These methods are based on the methodology developed in 
(Peresetsky et al., 2004a; Peresetsky, 2007, 2009). 
Multinomial models. Several recent papers have used the multinomial model in order 
to predict the probability of one alternative which is the focus of interest. It turned out that the 
accuracy of the probability of prediction of that alternative is higher than that for the binary 
choice model. Examples are: 
Baslevent et al. (2009) use a multinomial logit model to study which factors define an 
individual’s choice in Turkey in favor of one of the political parties — the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; or AKP). Other alternatives are the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), the True Path Party (DYP), the Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP), the Democratic Peoples’ Party (DEHAP). 
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) argue that ignoring differences between the period 
immediately post-crisis and the stable period decreases the accuracy of the prediction of the 
probability of financial crisis (post-crisis bias). They suggest a multinomial model which 
discriminates between three states of the economy: stable, post-crisis, and pre-crisis (which is 
the focus of interest). Using the sample of 20 emerging markets (including Russia) for the 
period 1993–2001 they conclude that their model provides a substantial improvement in the 
ability to forecast financial crises in comparison with the binary choice model. 
Correia et al. (2007) analyze the probability that a Portuguese tourist will choose 
Latin America as a vacation destination; the alternative destinations are Europe, the tropical 
Atlantic island of Sao Tome, and Guinea-Bissau in West Africa. They compare mixed logit 
and binary logit models. 
Koetter et al. (2007) study the impact of the financial state of banks on the probability 
of bank mergers. To test whether distressed mergers are different from non-distressed 
mergers they use a multinomial model with 5 possible outcomes. 
Wei et al. (2005) analyze the factors which are important for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) entry strategy. They focus on a binary choice between wholly owned enterprises 
(WOEs) and equity joint ventures (EJVs). They argue that classifying FDI into four entry 
modes  (wholly owned enterprise (WOE), equity joint venture (EJV), joint stock company 
(JSC), and contractual joint venture (CJV)) increases precision of the analysis.  
A binary logit model was used in the papers (Peresetsky et al., 2004; Peresetsky, 
2007) to model the probability of default for Russian banks. The definition of default was 
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withdrawal of the license from the bank by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). Cases of 
mergers were analyzed individually and if a bank was in distress before the merger, the event 
was interpreted as being a default. This set of papers analyzed Russian banks over the 1996–
2004. However during the later period 2005–2008 CBR orders on license withdrawal often 
gave the reason as “money laundering”. This was related to increased control for the banks’ 
financial reports which took place during the time when A.A. Kozlov occupied the position 
of First Deputy Chairman of the CBR. 
 
3. License withdrawal. Binary choice models vs. multinomial models 
 
3.1. Data 
In this paper we use quarterly data for the period 2005.1 to 2008.4 for about 1200 Russian 
banks. During this period 124 banks had their banking licenses withdrawn. At the end of each 
quarter the state of a bank was fixed as either “still alive” (variable live = 1) or “default” 
(live = 0) if the bank license has been withdrawn in that quarter. If the bank license had been 
withdrawn the reason indicated in the CBR order was coded as laundry = 1 for money 
laundering; law_violation = 1 for “violation of federal law and cheating in financial report”; 
insolvency = 1 for “financial insolvency and insufficient capital” and voluntarily = 1 if the 
bank ceased activity voluntarily. If several reasons were indicated, the value 1 was assigned 
to various appropriate dummy variables. 
To avoid autocorrelation of observations and to get a balanced data set, the data were 
thinned out in line with an algorithm suggested in (Peresetsky, 2007). For the banks which 
lost their licenses at time  the data includes observations of their states at the moments 
 that is backwards, with step-lengths of 8 quarters. For the banks which were 
sound at the end of 2008, an initial point was chosen at random from the 4 quarters of 2008, 
and, as for the procedure adopted for defaulted banks, observations at time moments 
 were included into the data. 
t
, 8, 16,.t t t− − ..
.., 8, 16,.t t t− −
During the period 2005.1–2008.4 unlike during the earlier period 1996–2004 
(Peresetsky, 2007) the CBR decision-making time became shorter. This was partly explained 
by the fact that a significant number of banking license withdrawals were for “money 
laundering” (Table 1). For this reason each observation of bank state at time t  is attached to 
the data set together with its balance sheet data at the time 4t −  (unlike  adopted in 
(Peresetsky, 2007)). Thus, in this paper we study the question: to what extent could the 
8t −
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probability of banking license withdrawal one year later on be estimated from current 
publicly available information? 
Table 1. Distribution of grounds for bank license withdrawal during the period 2005.2–
2008.4. 
 laundry voluntarily insolvency law_violation 
laundry 76 0 3 1 
voluntarily 0 5 0 0 
insolvency 3 0 7 15 
law_violation 1 0 15 17 
Total 80 5 25 33 
Source: CBR  http://www.cbr.ru/credit/likvidbase/LikvidBase.aspx 
 
For DIA purposes it is especially important is to be able to predict bank license 
withdrawal on economic grounds (poor financial state), whether or not “money laundering” is 
presented as additional grounds. Thus grounds of license withdrawals were aggregated as 
follows. Variable reason = 0, if license was not withdrawn; reason = 1, if in the CBR order 
the reason was indicated as “money laundering” (laundry = 1, and law_violation = 0, and 
insolvency = 0), but without economic reasons; and reason = 2 if any economic reasons were 
indicated. In this aggregation 5 voluntarily license withdrawals fell into the group reason = 2, 
which might be incorrect, since in some cases of voluntary license withdrawal the financial 
state of the bank could be solid (for example in the case of a merger between two solid 
banks). 
Dummy variables laundry1, economic, are indicators of this aggregated reasons: 
laundry1 = 1 if reason = 1; economic = 1 if reason = 2; and dummy variable default = 1 –
 live is an indicator of any type of license withdrawal. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of license withdrawals over the time period. Note 
that most of the CBR license withdrawal orders were issued within the period 2005–2006, 
when CBR orders were signed by the First Deputy Chairman of CBR A.A. Kozlov3 (killed 
on September 13, 2006).  Later most of these orders were signed by First Deputy Chairman 
of CBR G.G. Melikiyan. 
                                                
 
 
3 Since 2002 A.A. Kozlov was responsible for the supervision of banks, Also he supervised admission 
of banks into the deposit insurance system. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Russian bank license withdrawals 
 
Table 2 presents a list of macroeconomic indicators (quarterly data) which we use as a 
control for a varying macroeconomic environment. Table 3 presents the financial indicators 
reflecting the risk taken by a bank. All bank financial indicators are expressed in relative 
units, except for the measure of bank size, expressed as log of assets. A large bank is usually 
supposed to be more stable (too-big-to-fail) since it has more resources to smooth shocks and 
has more diversified risks. Five banks are excluded from the data: Sberbank, VTB, 
Gazprombank, Bank of Moscow, Russian Agricultural Bank, for which in our opinion the 
probabilities of defaults are negligible since they are likely to have government support in 
case of trouble. 
The values of all indicators — microeconomic and macroeconomic — were taken at 
the time 4 quarters ahead of observation of the bank state. All data are deflated by the CPI 
price index (HSE). Table A1 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the data. 
 
Table 2. Macroeconomic indicators 
Notation Macroeconomic indicator 
d4_gdp GDP growth rate during the last 4 quarters 
d4_infl CPI growth rate during the last 4 quarters 
erate Ruble/US Dollar exchange rate 
unempl Unemployment rate 
trade Export/Import ratio 
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Table 3. Bank financial indicators 
Notation Bank financial indicator 
bpca Profit / Assets 
gdoca Government securities / Assets 
keca Loans to non-financial firms / Assets 
laca Liquid assets / Assets 
mbkca Interbank loans / Assets 
ncbca Non-government securities / Assets 
lnoksca log (Turnover on correspondents accounts / Assets) 
pnaca Other non-working assets / Assets 
reske Reserves for possible losses on loans to non-financial firms / Loans to non-financial firms 
skca Equity / Assets 
vdflca Households’ deposits / Assets 
vdulca Firms’ deposits / Assets 
lnca log (Assets / CPI) 
ke_fca Loans to households / Assets 
 
3.2. Binary choice models 
A preliminary analysis is presented in Table 4. Each column shows binary logit model 
estimates for the variables default (license withdrawn); laundry (“money laundering” among 
the grounds for license withdrawal); laundry1 (“money laundering” among the grounds for 
license withdrawal, but with no economic reasons); economic (“financial insolvency” among 
the reasons of license withdrawal). For each dependent variable 3 models are presented: the 
first includes both micro- and macroindicators, the second includes only macroindicators, and 
the third includes only microindicators. 
 
Goodness-of-fit measure — pseudo-R2. 
• The full model, i.e. including all indicators, and the model with only microindicators have 
slightly better pseudo-R2 values for the variable laundry1 than for the variable laundry. Thus 
one could better forecast “money laundering” if it were not mixed in with license withdrawal 
on economic grounds. Thus we will consider below only models for laundry1. 
• Prediction of a bank’s financial distress is more precise than prediction of “money 
laundering” (the appropriate pseudo-R2 values for full models are 0.340 and 0.284, 
respectively); the same is true for the two “short” models. 
• Model fit for “money laundering” is determined mostly by microindicators (pseudo-R2 = 
0.203) and to a smaller extent by macroindicators (pseudo-R2 = 0.0781). Contrary to what is 
seen for license withdrawal on economic grounds, the contribution of microindicators 
(pseudo-R2 = 0.0875) is smaller than the contribution of macroindicators (pseudo-R2 = 
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4( ) ( )t t tP default x d
 
• Sets of the microindicators which are significant at the 10% level also differ for the two 
different grounds for default. In the model for license withdrawal on economic grounds 5 
indicators are significant: ncbca, mbkca, skca, bpca, reske. All these indicators reflect risks 
inherent in the bank’s financial state. Size of the bank, lnca is insignificant, may be due to 
multicollinearity. High values of non-government securities (ncbca) and reserves for possible 
losses (resca), low values of balance sheet profit (bpca) increase the probability of license 
withdrawal. Low involvement in the interbank market (mbkca) and high values of 
capitalization (skca) also increase the probability of license withdrawal. This less expected 
result probably reflects the structure of a bank’s balance sheet in a pre-default state. Quite 
different factors are significant for license withdrawal due to money laundering. High values 
of correspondent accounts turnover (lnoksca) increase the probability of license withdrawal. 
Significant also are households’ and firms’ deposits: clients prefer not to make deposits in 
suspicious banks. Balance sheet profit is significant, but with opposite sign. Only the impact 
of the quality of loan portfolio on a bank’s likelihood to default has the same direction for 
both models. 
Other factors. It is quite plausible that there are other factors having significant 
impacts on the probability of bank license withdrawal which are not included in the models 
(Table 4). To reveal the existence of such factors and the direction of their influence on the 
license withdrawal let us consider the model (1). 
 
• Only 2 macroindicators are significant for the money laundering reason, while 4 out of 5 
macroindicators are significant for the economic reason. The exchange rate (erate), inflation 
(d4_infl), and the GDP growth rate (d4_gdp) are significant for the economic reason and 
insignificant for the money laundering reason. 
0.238). Thus license withdrawal on economic grounds depends on the macroeconomic 
environment to a greater extent than it does for “money laundering”. 
Values and significance of the models’ coefficients differ according to the grounds for 
the default. 
β τ τγ+ ′= Λ +       (1) 
 
Table 4. Binary logit models   
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Variable default default default laundry laundry laundry laundry1 laundry1 laundry1 economic economic economic
erate -0.778*** -0.616*** -0.126 -0.0319 -0.133 -0.0448 -1.104*** -1.061***
trade 5.558*** 4.683*** 4.569*** 3.779*** 4.443*** 3.605*** 4.931*** 4.702***
unempl -1.100*** -0.823*** -1.291*** -1.078*** -1.238*** -1.002*** -0.862 -0.510
d4_gdp 92.29*** 64.29*** -28.55 -39.67 -26.16 -37.93 136.1*** 118.6***
d4_infl 70.71*** 61.15*** 12.94 13.60 11.22 11.91 97.00*** 91.45***
lnca 0.507 0.529 1.232 1.464* 1.040 1.283 0.0936 0.113
lnca2 -0.0318 -0.0287 -0.0629* -0.0710** -0.0549* -0.0635** -0.0107 -0.00465
ncbca 4.252*** 6.314*** 3.029* 5.439*** 3.134* 5.447*** 5.713** 6.797***
laca 2.753* 5.647*** 2.057 4.918*** 2.210 4.948*** 3.256 5.532***
mbkca -4.109** -1.678 -1.533 0.651 -1.423 0.751 -9.320** -7.692**
lnoksca 0.380*** 0.251** 0.374*** 0.287** 0.396*** 0.310** 0.324 0.123
pnaca 1.646* 0.962 1.490 1.013 1.744 1.330 0.521 0.0967
skca 1.802*** 0.736 1.035 0.191 1.145 0.279 2.509** 0.903
vdflca -2.766** -1.810 -7.308*** -6.737*** -9.695*** -9.152*** 1.134 1.775
vdulca -3.639** -3.451** -3.628** -3.468** -3.899** -3.726* -2.117 -2.648
keca 2.493* 5.172*** 1.930 4.525*** 2.073 4.594*** 3.225 5.311***
ke_fca -2.449* -2.029 -2.512 -2.315 -2.512 -2.379 -1.522 -1.424
gdoca 1.673 3.839** 2.102 3.751** 2.168 3.772** 0.883 3.310
bpca 1.678 1.627 5.426* 5.232** 5.171* 5.063* -12.06** -8.618**
reske 2.171*** 2.059*** 1.989*** 1.954*** 2.067*** 2.024*** 2.068* 1.694
Constant -165.7*** -125.8*** -10.90*** 9.437 25.24 -15.35*** 9.789 25.34 -14.35*** -233.9*** -208.8*** -10.62*
Observatons 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429
Pseudo-R2 0.291 0.132 0.141 0.271 0.0869 0.182 0.284 0.0781 0.203 0.340 0.238 0.0875
defaults (ones) 124 80 76 48
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
 
 
 
 
In equation (1)  is the c.d.f. of the logistic distribution, Λ tx  is set of all factors (Table 
4) at time . The dummy variable t
1, | | 1,
0, | | 1t
t
d
tτ
τ
τ
− ≤⎧= ⎨ − >⎩  is an indicator that the moment t  is 
no more than one quarter away from the moment τ . Thus, this dummy variable aggregates 
the influence of all unaccounted factors in the models (Table 4) factors in the neighborhood 
of the moment τ . Accordingly, if the coefficient τγ  is significantly different from 0 and 
positive it shows the existence at time τ  of unaccounted factors which increase the 
probability of a bank’s license withdrawal 4 quarters later, at time 4τ + . 
Figure 2 presents plots of estimates of coefficients τγ  against time period τ  for 3 full 
regressions (all variables from Table 4 included) with dependent variables default, laundry1, 
economic. Circle marks indicate values, significantly different from 0 at 5% significance 
level; a missed point corresponds to a quarter with no defaults on specified grounds. 
Note an interesting feature of the plot related to the license withdrawal on the grounds 
of money laundering. Unaccounted factors significantly increased the probability of banks’ 
license withdrawal during the period 2004.4–2005.4, which corresponds to CBR orders 
issued during the period 2005.4–2006.4. The beginning of that period corresponds to the 
introducing of deposit insurance in Russia and the admission of banks to the deposit 
insurance system.4 The end of the period coincides in time with the departure of First Deputy 
Chairman of the CBR, A.A. Kozlov (killed in September 2006). In 2003.4 and after 2006.1 
unaccounted factors either decreased the probability of license withdrawal on grounds of 
money laundering, or were insignificant. 
The impact of unaccounted factors on the probability of license withdrawal on 
economic grounds was significantly positive in 2003.3–2004.1 (CBR orders in 2004.3–
2005.1), and was significantly negative or insignificant after 2004.4. The period of positive 
impact is related to the revision of the financial states of banks during their initial admission 
to DIS. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) was created in January 2004; in September 2004 the first banks 
were admitted to the Deposit Insurance System (DIS). By March 2005 most of all banks (around 800) 
had been admitted to DIS. The initial admission of banks to DIS was completed in September 2005. 
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Figure 2. Impact of unaccounted factors on the probability of bank license withdrawal 
 
3.3. Multiple choice models 
In this section we estimate the multinomial logit model to test if this model provides more 
accurate forecasting than the binary logit model for the probability of a bank’s license being 
withdrawn on economic grounds. The possible preference of a multinomial model for the 
accurate prediction of one, focus of interest, alternative was discussed in Wei et al. (2005), 
Bussiere (2006), Correia et al. (2007), Koetter et al. (2007), Baslevent (2009). 
The multinomial logit model has the form (2): 
1
exp( )
( ) , 1,..., ; 1,...,
exp( )
i j
i k
i m
m
x
P y j i n j k
x
β
β
=
′= = = =
′∑
.  (2) 
Here  — observation number, i j  — number of the alternatives, ix  — vector of explanatory 
variables (factors) for the object i , jβ  — coefficient vector for the alternative j , ( )iP y j=  
— probability that object i  choose alternative j . We use the usual normalization 1 0β = . 
In our case observations are bank–quarters, the number of possible alternatives k  
equals 3: (i) license is not withdrawn (default = 0, 1j = ), (ii) license is withdrawn on the 
grounds of money laundering (laundry1 = 1, 2j = ), (iii) license is withdrawn on grounds of 
economic (financial insolvency) (economic = 1, 3j = ). 
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The first two columns of table 5 present estimates of the two binary logit models from 
Table 4; columns 3 and 4 present estimates of the coefficient vectors 2β  and 3β  of the 
multinomial logit model (2) (remember that 1 0β =  is the normalization). 
 
Table 5. Binary and multinomial models 
Model logit logit multinomial logit 
factor laundry1 economic laundry1 economic 
erate –0.133 –1.104*** –0.188 –1.105*** 
trade   4.443***   4.931***   4.660***   5.191*** 
unempl –1.238*** –0.862 –1.260*** –0.960 
d4_gdp –26.16   136.1*** –17.18   135.2*** 
d4_infl   11.22   97.00***   16.84   98.80*** 
lnca   1.040   0.0936   1.031   0.0847 
lnca2 –0.0549* –0.0107 –0.0550* –0.0113 
ncbca   3.134*   5.713**   3.509**   6.167** 
laca   2.210   3.256   2.364   3.522 
mbkca –1.423 –9.320** –1.676 –9.576** 
lnoksca   0.396***   0.324   0.414***   0.373 
pnaca   1.744   0.521   1.781   0.651 
skca   1.145   2.509**   1.226   2.585** 
vdflca –9.695***   1.134 –9.697***   0.976 
vdulca –3.899** –2.117 –3.966** –2.321 
keca   2.073   3.225   2.266   3.506 
ke_fca –2.512 –1.522 –2.583 –1.644 
gdoca   2.168   0.883   2.309   1.164 
bpca   5.171* –12.06**   4.938 –12.19** 
reske   2.067***   2.068*   2.153***   2.281* 
Constant   9.789 –233.9*** –4.852 –234.7*** 
Observations 4429 4429 4429 4429 
Pseudo-R2 0.284 0.340 0.313  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
From Table 5 one can find that estimates of the multinomial model coefficients 2β  
and 3β  are similar in their signs and significance to the coefficients of the corresponding 
binary logit models; also their values are not very different. 
A comparison of predictions made with binary and multinomial models is presented 
in Figures 3–5. Predictions of the probability of license withdrawal by both economic (Figure 
3) and money laundering (Figure 4) do not differ significantly between the two models. 
Figure 5 presents comparison of the predicted probabilities of bank survival. Predictions for 
the multinomial model were calculated from Table 5, and predictions for the binary model 
from Table 4 (column 1). Here predictions are a bit less similar than they were in the Figures 
3 and 4. 
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of license withdrawal on economic grounds 
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of license withdrawal for “money laundering” 
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Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of the bank’s survival 
 
It is possible to compare the predictive power of the two models by calculating 
proportions of correct forecasts; more precisely — by scatter plots of the probabilities of 
Type I – Type II errors. For each model we can calculate, for each observation i , predictions 
of the probability of default ˆ ip . Also we can choose the threshold  ( 0c 1c< < ) so that default 
is considered to be predicted for the observation i  when ˆ ip c> . Comparing these predictions 
with real default data we get estimates  for the probability of Type I error (when a bank 
predicted as solid actually defaults) and  or the probability of Type II error (when a 
bank predicted to default actually survives). Changing the threshold c  from 0 to 1, the points 
 trace out some curve in the unit square in the  plane. If the prediction 
(default/ no default) is chosen at random, this curve is the diagonal line (1,0)–(0,1) of the 
square. The closer the curve is to the axes, the better is the predictive power of the model. 
( )IP c
( )IIP c
( ( ), ( ))I IIP c P c ( , )IIIP P
Figures 6 and 7 present plots of the probabilities of Type I – Type II errors for the 
forecasts of license withdrawal for arbitrary reason, and of license withdrawal on economic 
grounds (the focus of interest for DIA). Each figure presents results both for the binary and 
multinomial models. Contrary to the results in the papers mentioned above, in our case the 
multinomial model does not provide more accurate forecasts than the binary model. 
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Figure 6. Graph of the probabilities of Type I–Type II errors for forecasts of license 
withdrawals 
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Figure 7. Graph of the probabilities of Type I–Type II errors for forecasts  
of license withdrawals on economic grounds 
 
In contrast to the predictions of default probabilities, marginal effects of factors on the 
probability of default differ for the binary and multinomial models. Two scatter plots of the 
marginal effects ( 1i
i
P laundry
x
∂ =
∂
1)  estimated by the two models are presented in the Figure 8 
for the factor x = skca (capitalization) and for the factor x =ncbca (non-government securities 
to total assets ratio). 
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Figure 8. Comparison of the marginal effect of skca (left) and  ncbca (right) on the 
probability of  bank license withdrawal on economic grounds,  
estimated by binary and multinomial models 
 
4. Conclusion 
We used binary and multinomial logit models to model probability of a Russian bank default 
(bank’s license withdrawal by CBR). The models use bank balance sheet financial indicators 
(microindicators) and indicators of macroeconomic environment (macroindicators) taken 4 
quarters before observation of a bank’s state (license is not withdrawn; license is withdrawn; 
license is withdrawn on grounds of “money laundering”; license is withdrawn on economic 
grounds, e.g. financial insolvency, fraud in bank reports, inability to fulfill financial 
obligations, etc.). All CBR orders for bank license withdrawals during the period 2005.2–
2008.4 were included into the data. 
We find that essentially different factors are significant in the models for bank license 
withdrawals by the CBR according to whether the grounds are “money laundering” or 
“economic”. The “unaccounted factors” which significantly increased the probability of  
banks’ license withdrawal during the period 2005.4–2006.4. could be related to the activity of 
First Deputy Chairman of the CBR, A.A. Kozlov. 
For practical reasons it is especially important for the DIA to have accurate forecasts 
of bank license withdrawals when these are on “economic” grounds, since in that case the 
DIA is responsible for covering the losses of depositors of the defaulted bank. This is why we 
pay special attention of whether a multinomial model with 3 possible outcomes (the license is 
not withdrawn; the license is withdrawn for “money laundering”; the license is withdrawn for 
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economic reasons) outperforms a binary logit model with two outcomes (the license is 
withdrawn for economics reasons; another outcome) in giving accurate predictions of bank 
defaults in which the DIA bears responsibility. 
We found that in our case the predictive powers of multinomial and binary models are 
approximately equal. A multinomial logit model does not outperform a binary logit model. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
d4_gdp 1.072 0.008 1.055 1.090 
d4_infl 1.115 0.020 1.074 1.148 
erate 28.577 1.603 24.650 31.640 
unempl 7.767 0.905 5.700 9.300 
trade 1.835 0.150 1.530 2.180 
bpca 0.014 0.021 –0.295 0.439 
gdoca 0.020 0.052 0.000 0.742 
keca 0.473 0.206 0.000 0.965 
laca 0.320 0.183 0.003 0.994 
mbkca 0.046 0.074 0.000 0.676 
ncbca 0.098 0.129 0.000 0.823 
lnoksca 0.994 0.886 –4.993 5.177 
pnaca 0.085 0.119 0.000 0.980 
reske 0.080 0.103 0.000 1.000 
skca 0.250 0.171 0.007 1.000 
vdflca 0.145 0.146 0.000 0.785 
vdulca 0.073 0.104 0.000 0.762 
lnca 13.348 1.807 6.758 19.386 
ke_fca 0.118 0.136 0.000 0.853 
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